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1st NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. [redacted]

THE NRO STAFF

February 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WOOD, OASD/SA

SUBJECT: OSD Management of Intelligence Programs

This responds to your memorandum, [redacted]7871-69, dated February 12, 1969.

We disagree completely with your thought that the management of the National Reconnaissance Program requires, or would be enhanced by, "normalization."

Preliminaries to this notion were first advanced by Dr. Enthoven i[redacted]5511-66, dated August 30, 1966. After discussion with Secretary Vance, Dr. Flax replied i[redacted]52621-66, dated October 31, 1966. When Secretary Nitze replaced Mr. Vance, a formal proposal for "normalization" was advanced (see Dr. Enthoven's [redacted]011-68, dated April 23, 1968) and, after discussions with Dr. Flax, Secretary Nitze disapproved the proposal i[redacted]3176-68, dated July 6, 1968. Our position with respect to your current version of these earlier proposals for "normalizing" the NRO is identical to that expressed in the previous replies to Dr. Enthoven.

Since your proposal discusses the applicability of the Target Oriented Display as a management device, you should also refer to Dr. Flax's memorandum to Secretary Nitze, [redacted]146-68, dated June 18, 1968, which points out the weaknesses of the TOD as well as the dangers of using it as an analytical tool for the National Reconnaissance Program.

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PAUL E. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director

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